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CASE NOTES
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-"SPURIOUS CLASS" PLAINTIFFS
ALLOWED TO INTERVENE AFTER CLAYTON ACT
LIABILITY FOR TREBLE DAMAGES WAS FIXED
The plaintiffs instituted a suit against the defendants charging a viola-
tion of the Clayton Act, Section 2(d). In the trial court the issues were
to be considered separately: (1) the determination of liability for a vio-
lation of the Act and (2) if liability was found, a determination of dam-
ages by a Master.' The trial court then held that the defendants had
not violated the antitrust laws and dismissed the action. The plaintiffs
appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision as it
pertained to two of the defendants, Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.
and Women's Day, Inc., but found that the other three defendants had
violated the Clayton Act.2 The case was remanded to the lower court
where the plaintiffs will have to prove the fact of damage as required by
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. Upon remand, the plaintiffs moved for a
ruling on the so-called "spurious class" suit issue which had not been
adjudicated by either the trial or appellate courts. In a memorandum and
order, the trial court held that the plaintiffs' action was a "spurious class"
action and ordered that a pre-trial conference be held to set a reasonable
time within which additional plaintiffs must intervene or be barred. State
Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 136 CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. 53 (N.D. Ill., 1959).
Class actions are allowed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 3 There are three types of class actions created by rule 23(a):
the true, the hybrid and the spurious.4 The three types have one thing in
common; the persons constituting the class in each type of action must
be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court. If that is the case, then such number of them, as will fairly insure
the adequate representation of all, may sue on behalf of all. It should be
understood that class actions are allowable only at the courts' discretion.
If the class is limited in- membership so that joinder of all members is
practicable, a class action is not permissible. 5 At this point resemblance
among the types of class actions ceases with agonizing abruptness and
1 State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 154 F. Supp. 471 (N.D.
1I., 1957). Liability determined under § 2(d) of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(d)
(Supp., 1958). Requirements of damage found in § 4 of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15
(Supp., 1958).
2 State Wholesale Grocers v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 258 F.2d 831 (C.A.
7th, 1958).
3 28 U.S.C.A., Rule 23 (Supp., 1958).
4 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 562 (Supp., 1958).
5 Hudson v. Newell, 172 F.2d 848 (C.A. 5th, 1949).
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the differences between them must be understood in order to comprehend
the effect of various findings and judgments of courts.
The differences arise in regard to the character of the right which is
being enforced. 6 The so-called true class action is brought to enforce a
right which is "joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the
owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of
the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it."'7
The so-called hybrid class action involves the enforcement of rights
accruing to several parties, individually as opposed to jointly, in an action
the object of which is the deciding of claims which may affect specific
property involved in the action.8 Hybrid actions are not common, but
they are well suited to relief of bondholders and in certain types of
creditors' suits.
The spurious class action allows a suit where the right is "several and
there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought."9 The rule creating this type of class
action is equivalent, for all intents and purposes, to the permissive joinder
rule, Rule 20(a). 10 It allows numerous persons having separate or several
rights for which a common relief is sought, based on common questions
of law or fact, to bring their actions before the courts at one time. Under
this rule, as under the permissive joinder rule, efficiency is at its maximum
because multiplicity of suits is avoided where possible.
As briefly stated in the facts, Rule 23(a) (3) was applied in the instant
case in the following manner: The issue of statutory liability had been
established by the appellate court and the case was remanded for the pur-
pose of proving the fact of damage as required by Section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act. Before proceeding further, the court, in a memorandum ruling,
held that all plaintiffs similarly situated would be allowed to intervene,
if they did so by a reasonable date to be established at a pretrial con-
ference.
The question of the effects of a judgment necessarily arises at this point.
Where a class action is brought and judgment is made, upon whom is
the judgment binding? Is the judgment res judicata upon the entire class
or only those members of the class who appeared in court? It is inter-
esting to note that during the Congressional Advisory Committee pro-
ceedings held in 1937 a proposal was suggested which would add to
6'2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure S 562 (Supp., 1958).
7 28 U.S.C.A., Rule 23 (a) (1) (Supp., 1958).
8 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure S 562 (Supp., 1958).
9 28 U.S.C.A., Rule 23 (a) (3) (Supp., 1958).
10 28 U.S.C.A., Rule 20 (Supp., 1958); Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737
(C.A. 7th, 1952); Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa., 1947).
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Rule 23 a provision pertaining to the effect of judgments under Rule
23.11 It was proposed that a judgment in a case brought under subsection
(a) (1) of Rule 23(a), the so-called true class action would be conclusive
upon the class; a judgment in the hybrid type class action would be con-
clusive upon all parties and privies to the action, and upon all claims,
whether or not presented in the action, to the degree that they do or
may affect specific property, unless such property is conveyed to or
retained by the debtor who is defendant in the action; and a judgment
in a spurious class action would be conclusive only upon the parties and
privies to the proceeding. This proposal was rejected by the Advisory
Committee because they felt it was a matter of substance and went beyond
the scope of procedure. However, the courts have taken the position,
as to the effect of judgments in true and spurious class actions, that was
contained in the proposed and rejected section of the rule. 12 Therefore,
it is settled that no member of a spurious class suit is bound by a judg-
ment unless he joins as plaintiff or as intervenor.13
The novel point in this Wholesale Grocers' case is that it has allowed
members of the class to intervene once trial has begun and after liability
has been established. The intervention was merely to prove the fact of
damage and obtain a judgment therefor. In other words, it becomes a
question of whether the intervention is timely.
If the court had not allowed members of the class to intervene, the
judgment would not be binding upon them. Their only alternative would
be to institute another action unless such new action would be barred
by the Statute of Limitations. If new proceedings are brought, there is
clearly a multiplicity of suits. If their action is barred by the Statute of
Limitations, there exists a right without a remedy. Therefore, it was in
the interests of justice that the court allowed intervention at that point,
being assured that the defendant's position was not prejudiced. The
determination of the defendant's liability would have been the same
regardless of the number of plaintiffs joined in that determination. Liabil-
ity of the defendant is predicated upon the act of placing advertisements
in a publication owned by one of its customers. Although the presence
of all of the plaintiffs was not necessary for the establishment of liability,
It Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure (1937) p. 60. For an excellent
discussion of this point consult Moore and Cohn, Federal Class Actions, Jurisdiction
and Effect of Judgments, 32 II. L. Rev. 555 (1938).
12 Judgment in true class actions binding on the class: Kentucky Home Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Duling, 190 F.2d 797 (C.A. 6th, 1951); U.S. v. American Optical Co.,
97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. I1., 1951). Judgment in spurious class actions binding upon only
those who join as plaintiffs or intervenors: Schatte v. International Alliance, 183 F.2d
685 (C.A. 9th, 1950); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. U.S. Ill F. Supp. 80 (D.C. N.J, 1953).
18 California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, 162 F.2d 893 (CA.2d, 1947);
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (C.A. 7th, 1941).
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it is clear that their appearance is necessary for proof of damage since
the law requires that each party must prove his damage.
A closer scrutiny of Rule 23(a)(3) will reveal as a matter of logic
that the intervention was timely. The requirements for bringing a class
action are: "(1), the parties must be so numerous as to make it impractical
to bring them all before the court; (2), the plaintiffs must adequately
represent the class, and (3), there must be some community of interest."'1 4
To first say that the plaintiff must show that there is such a great number
of plaintiffs that a class action must be brought, and then to say that any
member of the class not a party before trial cannot join after determina-
tion of an issue common to all members of the class, is a contradiction.
To bar non-participating members of the class after it has been shown
that it is impractical for them to participate defeats the purpose of Rule
23.
Whether intervention is to be allowed is a matter for the court's discre-
tion. "In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties."15 To show how far the court can go in exercising
its discretion, a recent case allowed intervention by a member of the class
after judgment and during the appellate proceedings. In Hurd v. Illinois
Bell Telephone,10 the good faith of the plaintiff in representing the class
was doubted and the petitioner sought to intervene in order to protect his
rights. The court said:
But, although intervention after judgment is not to be lightly permitted this
cause is so fraught with elements of possible prejudice to petitioner and other
petitioners similarly situated, that we, in the exercise of a sound discretion con-
clude that our order permitting petitioner to intervene should be allowed to
stand.17
Seemingly contra to the Wholesale Grocers memorandum opinion is a
1957 decision, Hess v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.'8 In that case, twenty-six
plaintiffs filed suit for violation of the antitrust laws, on behalf of them-
selves and others similarly situated. The entire class consisted of approxi-
mately 8,000 cotton growers in the San Joaquin Valley. The court did
not allow the spurious class action because the plaintiffs did not prove
they were representative of the class. It appeared that within the class
there were different types of relationships with the defendant. Also, 2,038
members of the class filed affidavits specifically stating that they were
opposed to participation in the suit and were unwilling to be represented
by the plaintiffs. The court did not stop there, however, and proceeded in
14 Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737, 740 (C.A. 7th, 1952).
15 28 U.S.C.A., Rule 24(b) (Supp., 1958). 17 Ibid., at 944.
16 234 F.2d 942 (C.A. 7th, 1956). 18 20 F.R.D. 466 (S.D. Cal., 1957).
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dictum to set up a procedural question of timeliness of joinder similar
to the situation in the Wholesale Grocers opinion. It then said that joinder
after the determination of liability would not have been allowed in such
a case.
Consideration of the cases ruling on intervention by a member of a
class, keeping in mind the legislative purposes for which Rule 23 was
adopted, leads to the conclusion that the intervention in the Wholesale
Grocers opinion was a proper exercise of the court's discretion. The
presence of all the members of the class at the determination of the issue
of liability, while hampering the court's process, would not have had any
effect upon their decision. Therefore, the defendant's position was not
prejudiced. The intervention of all the members of the class would not
now prejudice the defendants because the factual situation upon which
the determination of liability is based was adequately represented by the
original plaintiffs.
A court in exercising its discretion should carefully consider the factual
situation in each case. It is conceivable that intervention during or after
trial might prejudice a party. This is most apparent where a trial by
jury has been demanded. However, as noted in the Hurd case, interven-
tion at the appellate level might be a proper exercise of the court's discre-
tion. Let each ruling stand or fall on the facts.
LABOR LAW-"AGENCY SHOP" CLAUSE NOT VIOLATIVE
OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS UNLESS
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED
The business manager of Local 697, International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers, and Meade Electric Company negotiated a contract in
which they agreed on all terms except a provision commonly known as
the "agency shop" clause. The proposed "agency shop" clause provided
that union membership was not mandatory but, as a condition of continued
employment, all employees must pay the union an amount equal to that
paid in fees by the union members.
The company contended this clause was in violation of the Indiana
Right-To-Work Act. They filed a complaint in the Superior Court of
Lake County to enjoin the union from insisting that this clause be included
in the collective bargaining agreement. The Superior Court of Lake County
entered judgment for defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The Indiana
Appellate Court affirmed holding that the "agency clause" did not violate
the Indiana Right-To-Work law. Meade Electric Company v. Hagbert, 159
N.E.2d 408 (Ind. App., 1959).
The issue raised in this case is one of first impression. Although nineteen
states have such Right-To-Work laws there appears to be no case law on
